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Counterpart funds can offer many development
opportunities if used effectively but can also hamper
and distort development if improperly used. This
article reviews the rationale for the establishment of
counterpart funds and discusses the opportunities, and
lessons learned. The Canadian financed counterpart
fund in Peru and the Canadian supported Bolivia Social
Fund are both discussed. The discussion reflects on
Canadian aid policy and programming in the Americas
between 1988 and 1990.
1 CHARACTERISTICS OF THE AMERICAS
REGION
During the 1980s, Latin American countries were
faced with an onerous debt burden - one-third of
Latin America's export earnings were devoted to
paying interest on this debt. Most of the countries in
the region implemented economic reforms which in the
first instance resulted in considerable hardships for
certain segments of the population. This served to
aggravate the historically extreme social inequities
existing in Latin America. In tightening expenditures,
governments were forced to further reduce spending in
such key areas as basic education, health, housing and
protection of the environment.
Most Latin American and Caribbean governments
were receptive to the creation of counterpart fund
mechanisms for support of poverty alleviation
programming. Government support can be attributed
to a number of factors, including: public institutions in
many countries were recognized as weak due to
resource constraints and/or a history of military
governments; donor funding to Latin countries was
relatively small compared to the size of the economies;
certain segments of the population could best be served
through non-governmental channels (particularly
indigenous groups); and there was an urgent need to
mitigate the negative effects of structural adjustment
on vulnerable groups.
2 CANADIAN AID IN LATIN AMERICA
The Canadian International Development Agency's
(CIDA) policy on counterpart funds does not require
programmes to generate funds. If funds are generated
then the rationale for doing so must be provided and
Note: This article reflects the views of the author and is not intended to
represent the views of the Government of Canada.
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approved in the country programme framework (i.e. a
five year planning document) and appropriate financial
and administrative safeguards must be followed.
The objectives of the Canadian aid programme in the
Americas from 1988 to 1990 were to support structural
adjustment efforts of their economies, alleviate poverty
through support of income generating activities and
provision of social services, and support human
resource development and institutional strengthening.
Canadian aid to the Caribbean and Latin America in
fiscal year 1989/90 (non-inclusive of imputed
multilateral flows) was approximately $C272 million
(CIDA, 1990) and was completely grant financed.
Promotion of human rights, pluralistic societies, the
development and empowerment of human resources
and the participation of women were viewed by
Canadian aid policy-makers as integral to alleviating
poverty. These objectives could not be met exclusively
through central governments but required the
participation of local governments, non-governmental
groups and the private sector.
3 COUNTERPART FUND MECHANISMS
During the period 1988 to 1990, Canadian programming
in the Americas region established counterpart fund
mechanisms in the following programmes: Peru,
Bolivia, Ecuador, Colombia, Jamaica, Guyana, Haiti,
El Salvador, Honduras, Costa Rica and Nicaragua.
Total counterpart funds generated in 1990/91 were
SC53.0 million.
The mechanisms, the degree of control exercised by
Canada and the use of the funds varied considerably.
Responsibility and control of counterpart funds
depended on the countries' development situation, the
recipient country's adherence to sound economic and
social policies and respect for human rights, and the
capability of the recipient government or local non-
governmental organizations (NGOs) to deliver poverty
alleviation programmes.
For Jamaica and Costa Rica, counterpart funds were
programmed oniy through the government budgetary
process. This was based on the countries' demonstrated
commitment to the implementation of sound economic
policies. The counterpart funds generated in Honduras
were allocated through the government's budgetary
process to cover local cost financing of CIDA funded
projects and for transfers to a government social
investment fund.
In Guyana, balance of payments support was provided
in conjunction with the implementation of a stabilization
programme. A portion of the counterpart funds was
allocated to the consolidated revenue funds to support
the government's Public Sector Investment Pro-
gramme. A portion was allocated to a counterpart fund,
managed by a Canadian NGO and designed to
implement programmes targeted at the poor. For Peru,
lines of credit were provided despite the fact that
Canada did not, at that time, support the economic
policies of the government. Counterpart funds
generated were tightly managed and were utilized to
support the productive sectors and high social impact
projects.
In Colombia and El Salvador funding was non-
budgetary and was programmed through a non-
governmental mechanism. Funds generated by CIDA's
programme in Bolivia were allocated to the Bolivian
established Social Fund and also to a proven NGO
consortium.
In some cases, counterpart funds were established in
countries that did not have a programme with the IMF
or the World Bank, such as Colombia and Peru. In
other cases, at the time of implementation of
stabilization programmes, Canada believed that
insufficient resources were allocated to mitigate the
hardships imposed on certain segments of the
population and provided off-budgetary support for
poverty activities. In all cases, Canada consulted with
the Bank to ensure that funding activities were not
inconsistent with Bank promoted policies.
In those instances where counterpart funds were off-
budgetary, funds were deposited directly into a private
project account. The funds were spent in accordance
with criteria set out in a Memorandum of Under-
standing between Canada and the recipient government
and were normally channelled through non-govern-
mental organizations or the private sector to local
community associations/governments. In many
countries in Central and South America, this was the
only means to reach the poor indigenous populations
who had an inherent mistrust of working with the
central governments.
4 CANADIAN FINANCED COUNTERPART
FUND IN PERU
When Peru unilaterally refused to honour its debt
obligations in 1985, and attempted to nationalise banks
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and financial institutions, Peru's cooperation with
bilateral and multilateral donors and financing
institutions deteriorated or was halted. Under these
circumstances, CIDA saw its bilateral aid programme
circumscribed by growing security problems and the
need to respect arrangements of the international
financial community. Canada decided to continue aid
delivery to the poor so as not to double penalise those
who would suffer from a worsening economic situation.
CIDA therefore developed a line of credit and
counterpart fund programme that would:
ï) provide balance of payments support by making
available commodities and equipment under normal
commercial conditions, to viable and solvent economic
sectors (those able to pay, invest and repay debts);
ensure that the full value of the aid was channelled
to a Fund with no allowance for subsidies or any
diversion to budgetary support; and,
be consistent with CIDA's developmental strategy
in regard to self-sustaining, productive and environ-
mentally safe activities that assist the poorest segments
of the country.
Funds generated from lines of credit and food aid in
1990/91 were approximately $Cl 1.5 million. The lines
of credit were primarily commercial in nature and not
developmental. These lines of credit were made
conditional on the Government's agreement to the
generation of counterpart funds which would be
managed through an independent private and legal
entity which had administrative and operational
autonomy.
The counterpart fund mechanism provided for the
establishment of a Development Foundation to ensure
independence from governmental interference, the
provision of a Canadian technical assistance unit to the
foundation, and safeguards to protect the monetary
value of the funds.
The independence of the Development Foundation
was seen by all parties involved, particularly the
Government of Pru, as critical to the efficient and
effective delivery of development projects and
programmes at the time of its establishment. The
General Counterpart Fund Canada/Peru (GCFCP)
was successful in establishing its independence. It had
a five-member Board of Governors, of whom two were
Canadian officials, and a secretariat managed by two
co-directors. The staff comprised thirteen individuals.
Consultants were also used. A Canadian Technical
Assistance Unit was established to provide managerial,
technical, and administrative support to set up GCFCP
and develop the Secretariat. Its establishment was seen
by the Board and Peru, as crucial to the existence of the
Fund to act as a credible and efficient institution in
Peru.
Collecting and accounting for the funds generated by
the lines of credit was the responsibility of the GCFCP
Secretariat financial manager. The Canadian Embassy
in Lima was responsible for ensuring that counterpart
funds were paid. With the agreement of the
Government of Peru, payments to the CGFCP were
made in local currency, but deposited in a US dollar
denominated bank account which generated interest -
a critical factor in overcoming the loss of purchasing
power of the GCFCP. All withdrawals were in local
currency.
An operational evaluation of GCFCP reported that a
majority of projects were successful in achieving
expected results. In the informal, small business and
health and welfare sectors, the projects appeared to
have a high social impact at the micro and local level.
The impact of projects will take longer to measure for
the agriculture and disaster recovery sectors. The Fund
was particularly successful at financing projects which
reached the poor population living in zones affected by
insurgency guerilla activities (World Bank 1990).
5 THE CASE OF BOLIVIA - CREATION OF A
SOCIAL FUND
The Government of Bolivia established the public by-
pass agency, the Fondo Social de Emergencia (FSE) in
November 1986, as a temporary emergency response to
rapidly deteriorating social conditions caused by a
severe economic crisis and a drastic adjustment
programme. The FSE Director reported directly to the
President, which enabled the fund to achieve a high
degree of autonomy in its operations.
A consortium of donors including Canada (through
counterpart fund generation), Belgium, Germany,
Italy, IBRD, 1DB, UNDP and the OPEC Fund,
funded the FSE to a total of US$194 million. Following
initial success through the generation of small scale
temporary employment projects, the FSE expanded
rapidly.
In Bolivia, the NGOs like church groups and
community organizations proposed projects for central
social fund approval with private local contractors
implementing them. Zuckerman (1990) suggests that
this decentralized, grassroots approach:
- ensured that neither donors nor government
agencies determined project content (as has frequently
been the case in conventional projects);
- maximized incentives to prepare and maintain high-
quality community projects;
- reached remoter and poorer communities; and
- entailed lower-cost administration and technologies.
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Four major categories of projects were financed
including: Social assistance (10 per cent); Social
infrastructure (42 per cent); Economic infrastructure
(42 per cent); and Production support (6 per cent). In
1989 PSE was responsible for about 80 per cent of all
public investment in health and about 75 per cent in
education. The FSE has been heavily supervised and
studied by the donor community as well as its own staff.
As a result of the FSE projects, total disbursements
exceeded US$125 million. It is estimated that over
1.4 million people benefited and 547,000 person-
months of direct employment were created. The FSE
will be disbanded in 1991 and replaced by a Social
Investment Fund which will finance projects designed
to support sustainable development initiatives.
6 LESSONS FROM CIDA EXPERIENCE IN
LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN
The impact for CIDA as a result of counterpart fund
programming is illustrated in the following policy and
programming areas:
j Structural Adjustment - CIDA has been able to
support governments' efforts to implement macro-
economic reform, while at the same time ensuring that
additional funding has been provided to mitigate, to
some degree, the negative impact of reform on poorer
segments of the population.
ii Poverty - Canadian programming in the Americas
utilizes a number of different mechanisms for
implementing programming which directly benefits
and empowers the poor. Such activities tend to have
high local costs - counterpart fund generation is
probably the most efficient delivery mechanism for
providing local cost financing while meeting Canadian
aid requirements.
Canadian Administration Requirements -
through the provision of internationally competitive
goods procured in Canada, CIDA can meet its tied aid
requirements, provide balance of payments support to
the recipient government, and channel counterpart
fund resources for poverty activities through local non-
governmental organizations (NGOs) or local govern-
ments. Providing lines of credit is much less
administratively intensive for CIDA than regular
programming, which places high demands on CIDA
staff, from the selection and contracting stage
throughout project implementation.
Reducing Distortions - the generation of funds
can reduce the discretion of the government and distort
the government's investment priorities. To minimize
distortions (when Canada agrees with the policies of the
country) Canada either provides aid in support of IMF
programmes or stipulates that the counterpart funds
finance projects which are supportive of the
government's stated priorities. In addition, most Fund
mechanisms are required to have a representative of the
recipient government on the project selection
committee.
y) Coordination - there must be coordination of
donor counterpart funds, particularly in countries
which rely heavily on development assistance, such as
Guyana.
Reliable Financing - to provide reliable financing
of projects, there should be assured continuity in the
delivery of goods and commodities, preferably at
regular intervals throughout the year. For most
countries, the counterpart funds generated from several
project sources (including food aid) are consolidated
into one Fund mechanism.
Accounting of Funds - administratively, CIDA
has learned that it is important that a mechanism for
collection and disbursement of funds must be
operational when generation of funds commences to
avoid an accumulation of funds and the associated
inflationary impact. Responsibility for the deposit and
accounting of funds (i.e. timing, appropriate exchange
rates, etc.) must be clearly spelt out in the agreement
between governments and specify that funds are to be
credited without delay to a specified independent
interest-bearing account at the full CIF value, before
subsidies or deductions.
Policy Dialogue - CIDA has also learned that
the sustainability of poverty activities is dependent on
government implementation of social policy reform
designed to reduce extreme income disparities. Canada
has had minimal success in utilizing counterpart funds
to affect recipient country budgetary allocations, in
part due to the limitations of donors in carrying out the
economic and budgetary analysis necessary to negotiate
conditionality and monitor adherence. In one or two
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instances, recipient countries have advised Canada not
to utilize the budgetary process to channel monies to
non-governmental organizations because of the
difficulties of having the monies released.
Non-budgetary support provides leverage to ensure
additionality of poverty alleviation activities. The
danger is that governments will not undertake required
policy reforms aimed at strengthening public sector
agencies and addressing income inequities.
Coordination with the donor community is important
to ensure follow-up or parallel social sector adjustment
operations containing more comprehensive sector
policy reforms.
7 CONCLUSION
From the donor perspective, the establishment of
counterpart funds for poverty activities can provide
insurance, a form of social equity conditionality and a
cost effective means of targeting the poorer segments of
the population.
While central governments must establish the
appropriate framework for development, other levels of
government, non-governmental institutions and the
private sector have an equally important role to play in
development. Counterpart funds offer a valuable
mechanism for supporting the 'other' players.
Nevertheless, counterpart funds can be counter
productive if not properly managed. If donors choose
to exercise control over the allocation of resources they
must ensure that counterpart fund expenditures are
planned in advance of fund accumulation and that the
Fund mechanisms are more efficient and/or effective
than the government at reaching target groups.
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